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LANDLORD AND TENANT - NOTICE TO TERMINATE - SUBSEQUENT
COLLECTION OF RENT As WAIVER OF NOTICE - Defendant tenant held
under a month-to-month tenancy. On September I 2, plaintiff landlord served
him with the requisite thirty-day notice to terminate the tenancy.1 On October
26, plaintiff was awarded possession by default judgment in summary proceedings before the circuit court commissioner. Defendant subsequently posted an
appeal bond to stay execution and appealed to the circuit court. While the appeal
was pending, plaintiff billed and collected the October rent and utility charges.
Defendant claimed that this waived plaintiff's notice. Held, there was no waiver
of notice since the Michigan statutes contemplate recovery of rent until the
landlord obtains possession. 2 Detroit Webster Hall Go. v. Webster Corner Bar,
294 Mich. 147, 292 N. W. 683 (1940).
Generally at common law a landlord who accepts rent, eo nomine, accruing
after the expiration of his notice to terminate thereby waives his notice,3 but

1. 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 13492, 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937), §
26.1104. In Michigan a month-to-month tenancy is regarded as a tenancy at will.
Haines v. Beach, 90 Mich. 563, 51 N. W. 644 (1892).
2 A tenant who appeals from a decision of a circuit court commissioner must post
an appeal bond of twice the rental value of the premises. This bond is conditioned
upon the tenant's paying all the rent due up to the time that the landlord obtains
possession in the event that the circuit court affirms the commissioner's award. 3 Mich.
Comp. Laws (1929), § 14987, 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.1998. The landlord also has the option of suing in trespass on the case for double damages from the
time of notice to quit until possession is obtained. 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §
14986, 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.1997.
8 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 1463 (1912); 120 A. L. R. 557 at 562
(1939). Contra: Davies v. Bristow, [1920] 3 K. B. 428.
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acceptance of rent accruing prior thereto does not constitute such a waiver. 4
The probable reason for this rule is that the landlord after the expiration of
his notice has a choice of remedies. He can maintain ejectment ( or summary
proceedings) for possession, or he can act to recover the rent due. However, he
cannot exercise both rights at the same time, since he would then be treating the
same person simultaneously as tenant and trespasser. 5 This is understandable in
light of the common-law doctrine that the service of a declaration in ejectment
operates as a final election to determine the tenancy and bars the landlord's
right to collect rent accruing thereafter, even in the absence of a final judgment.6 In the instant case, since statutes are interpreted as entitling the landlord to rent up to the time he recovers possession, a different result follows and
no waiver occurs. 7 The problem can also be analyzed from a different aspect.
Waiver is usually regarded as the intentional relinquishment by words or conduct of a known right by a person in a position to assert that right. 8 In the
present case the landlord had already done all that was within his power to
recover possession, and the fact that the tenant still held over can be attributed
to the operation of the statute and his appeal bond, rather than to any permission
from the landlord. On the basis of this analysis, there should be no waiver of
the notice implied from the act of collecting rent. Some English courts have
reached somewhat analogous results under the Rent Restriction Acts on the
ground that in certain cases a statutory tenancy arises after the expiration of
notice and the landlord is entitled to collect rent for such term without preju4
ln this situation the rent is due under an existent lease. 120 A. L. R. 557 at
561 (1939).
6
Goodwright v. Cordwent, 6 T. R. 219, 101 Eng. Rep. 520 (1795).
6
Jones v. Carter, 15 Mees. & W. 718, 153 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1846); 93 A. L. R.
1474 at 1475 (1934). However, as an incident to the ejectment action, the landlord
could recover mesne profits for the value of the use and occupation while possession
was withheld.
7 Palmer v. City Livery Co., 98 Wis. 33, 73 N. W. 559 (1897). It should be
pointed out that technically there can be no such thing as a waiver of notice to terminate. Once the notice has run the term is at an end. What appears to be a waiver of
notice is actually the creation of a new tenancy based on the same terms and conditions
as the old one and inferred from the payment and acceptance of rent. See Clerk,
"Waiver of Notice to Quit by Acceptance of Rent," 37 L. Q. REv. 203 (1921) and
34 HARV. L. REV. 203 (1920). In the same connection a waiver of a breach of
condition in a lease, while superficially analogous, is essentially different from a
waiver of notice to terminate.
In Doe ex dem. Cheny v. Batten, I Cowp. 243, 98 Eng. Rep. 1066 (1775),
Lord Mansfield said that since the landlord was entitled to double rent under the
statute of 4 Geo. 2, c. 28 ( I 73 I), for the period during which a tenant holds over after
a notice to quit, the acceptance of single rent waives only the right to collect double
rent, and it is a question of fact for the jury whether it also signifies an intention by
the landlord to waive his remedy of ejectment. This decision was an anomalous one
in so far as it mistakenly quoted the statute and never seems to have been followed in
England. See Clerk, "Waiver of Notice to Quit by Acceptance of Rent," 37 L. Q.
REV. 203 (1921).
8
Jones v. Della Maria, 48 Cal. App. 171, 191 P. 943 (1920).
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dice to his notice. 9 In the instant case there was an additional factor, in that the
landlord had already been awarded possession before he collected the rent. While
some cases have held that the acceptance of rent after the institution of proceedings for possession waived the notice,1° there have apparently been none
holding that the acceptance of such rent after an award of possession would
have the same effect. The principal case might be criticized for making the
basic assumption that the landlord is entitled by virtue of the statutes to receive
the rent in question before as well as after the appeal has been decided. If the
landlord is entitled to rent solely by virtue of the statutes, it might well follow
that he is entitled to it only at such time and in such manner as is provided for
by the statutes. In collecting the rent at any other time and in any other manner,
the landlord could be said to have disregarded his rights under the statutes,
and thereby to have placed himself under the common-law rule that acceptance
of rent is a waiver of notice. However, the result reached seems to be desirable
and is consistent with the realities of the situation, even though the reasoning
may not strictly observe technical property law doctrines.11

9 Davies v. Bristow, [1920] 3 K. B. 428. For a somewhat similar situation, see
Chiera v. MacDonald, 121 Mich. 54, 79 N. W. 908 (1899).
10 Berman v. Bickle, 128 Misc. 342, 217 N. Y. S. 885 (1926); Klein v. Journal
Square Bank Building Co., 110 N. J. Eq. 607, 160 A. 812 (1932); Jones v. Della
Maria, 48 Cal. App. 171? 191 P. 943 (1920).
11 The court might have pointed out as a precautionary matter that the landlord
in collecting this rent before the decision thereby waived his right to collect any rent
for the same period after a favorable decision on appeal.

